Posts Tagged ‘Alison Renton’

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The Ontario Human Rights Code’s preamble states its purpose, in part, is “the creation of a climate of understanding and mutual respect for the dignity and worth of each person”. The Code is not intended to “punish” a person or company that engages in discrimination. Rather it is remedial or restorative, aiming to compensate the person who has experienced discrimination. The overriding goal of the Code is ultimately the elimination of discrimination within the Province of Ontario.

When an individual who believes she or he has experienced discrimination is completing an application, it is important to carefully consider who will be named as respondents. It is important to applicants that the perpetrators of discrimination are held to account – whether they are individual or an organization. A finding of discrimination will often provide validation to an applicant and re-affirm his or her value as a person, as well as their dignity and sense of belonging. In these cases, individuals who are alleged to have engaged in discrimination should be named along with the company.

Naming Individual Respondents – Two Scenarios


Over the past few years, a troubling trend has emerged in the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario’s case law relating to the naming and removal of individual respondents. To fully flush this out, it is important to distinguish between two very different scenarios:

  1. Betty files an application against her employer, a regional municipality. In addition to naming the municipality as a respondent, she also names the mayor, the deputy mayor and the COO – all of whom were not involved personally with the facts that give rise to her human rights application.
  1. John files an application against his employer, a regional municipality, and also against his immediate supervisor who regularly made inappropriate remarks and slurs toward John because of his race.

Scenario one above happens all too often and is a legitimate concern. Naming individuals who have nothing to do with the facts of an application unnecessarily adds to the complexity of a proceeding and is inappropriate.

Scenario two, however, is markedly different. John should be permitted to pursue an application against his immediate supervisor – the individual who engaged in conduct that was demeaning and derogatory toward John on the basis of his race. Of course, the employer is also responsible for John’s conduct by virtue of section 46.3 of the Code which imputes liability to a corporation for the employee’s actions and omissions done in the course of his employment.

The Tribunal Goes Too Far to Remedy Inappropriate Naming of Individual Respondents


In an effort to counter the inappropriate naming of individual respondents (such as in scenario 1, above), the Tribunal has gone too far. Its jurisprudence now encroaches into the territory of appropriately named individual respondents. Consider the following:

In Delargie v. St. Joseph’s Healthcare Hamilton (2015),[i] Vice-Chair Alison Renton considered a request from the respondents to remove an individual respondent who was named along with the organizational respondent. The Tribunal specifically noted that the individual respondent’s conduct was “central to this case”; however, it removed the individual respondent nonetheless, stating at paragraph 8:

In the circumstances of this case, the individual conduct of the personal respondent is central to this case. While the organizational respondent has not explicitly stated that it would assume liability for the personal respondent in the event that Code violations were found, a joint Response was filed on behalf of both respondents, and the respondents submit both that the personal respondent was not acting outside the scope of her authority and that the factors set out in Persaud, above, support their request to remove the personal respondent. Implicitly the organizational respondent has represented that it will assume liability for the personal respondent’s actions. [bolding added]

The reasoning of the Tribunal in Delargie appears to be – the individual respondent is alleged to have engaged in actions that on their own may be a violation of the Code; however there is an organization  with the financial capacity to assume liability for the employee’s actions, such that we should remove the individual who may have engaged in discriminatory conduct. What happened to accountability? What message does it send when the Tribunal will simply release individuals accused of discrimination because they work for a company that has money? Is the overarching aim of the Code being furthered by this practice? When did section 46.3 of the Code (which imputes liability on the employer for the employee’s actions) become sufficient to release the individual employee?

In Breau v. Halton (Regional Municipality) (2016),[ii] the Applicant raised these principles when opposing a request to remove the individual respondents. Specifically, in opposition to the request, the Applicant stated:

The Code is remedial and restorative – it is not punitive. The Applicant is not requesting that the personal respondents remain a part of the Application for punitive reasons, but rather because the Applicant, and society at large, have an interest in ensuring that remedies are ordered against perpetrators of discrimination in order to achieve one of the primary purposes of the Code, the elimination of discrimination…

There is a troubling trend appearing recently in Tribunal jurisprudence that appears to simply release personal respondents should the corporate respondent accept liability on their behalf and agree to cover any remedy ordered. In the Tribunal’s search for efficiency, it seemingly, in some cases, fails to give credence to the remedial nature of the Code and something is lost in that process. Individuals should be held to account for their independent, discriminatory actions. In this case, the personal respondents should not be removed.

Again, the Tribunal removed the individual respondents, stating at paragraph 14:

…There is an organization respondent (the Regional Municipality of Halton) in the proceeding that is alleged to be liable for the same alleged conduct as them, no issue has been raised to the organization respondent’s deemed or vicarious liability for their alleged conduct, there is no issue as to the ability of the organization respondent to respond to or remedy any infringements of the Code, and no real prejudice would be caused to the applicant or any other party as a result of removing them as respondents to the Application. The reasons that the applicant raised to continue the proceeding against the [individual respondents] have some merit, but I do not agree that they are sufficiently compelling to continue the proceeding against them…

If we hope to reduce discrimination in Ontario, holding individual perpetrators of discrimination accountable for their actions is important. If we hope to provide redress to those who have experienced discrimination, allowing them to advance their claim against each party who perpetrated the discrimination is important. If the perpetrator simply becomes a witness to the process, something meaningful for an applicant is lost.

I recognize the Tribunal wishes to eliminate the number of respondents to ensure the hearing does not become unnecessarily complex. Proceeding against the individuals who are alleged to have individually perpetrated the discrimination, alongside the organizational respondent if there is one, is necessary if we hope to prevent discrimination and provide meaningful redress.

Another practical consideration is that organizational respondents may go bankrupt. Without an individual respondent, some applicants may find themselves without any potential for compensation.

Steps in the Right Direction?


The same arguments put forward in Delargie were raised before the Tribunal recently in Nakazi v. Bowland Dental Laboratories (2017).[iii] In an interim decision, Vice-Chair Laurie Letheren refused to remove the individual respondent, stating:

Although there are two corporate respondents to this Application, there remains a possibility that the Tribunal could find that [the individual respondent] was personally liable for his own conduct which amounted to a breach of the Code…it remains potentially open to the Tribunal to make findings of liability and require monetary remedies specifically from the personal respondents for their actions if it was to find that these actions were discriminatory.[iv]

This ruling may seem narrow, in that the Tribunal would only retain an individual respondent where there is a possibility that liability may fall outside of the vicarious liability provision in section 46.3 of the Code. I do not believe this is what the adjudicator in this decision meant to imply because she then went out to cite the Divisional Court in  Human Rights Commission v. Farris (2012),[v] where that Court, stated:

The fact that a corporate respondent may also be jointly and severally liable for the conduct of employees is not a basis to insulate the employees from personal liability…The purpose of s. 46.3 of the Code is to confirm the parallel statutory liability of corporations for the actions of their employees, not to replace it.

The Divisional Court goes on to explicitly state in Farris that one of the “fundamental principles of human rights law” is:

…a finding of corporate liability is not meant to act as a shield against a finding of individual liability where the acts of the individual constitute a violation of the Code.

Unfortunately, to date, the Divisional Court’s guidance on this issue has not been consistently followed by the Tribunal.


Hopefully, we are seeing a reversal of the Tribunal’s trend to remove individual respondents where an organization is also named as a respondent.

Future applicants to the Tribunal should give thought to whether individuals have personally engaged in behaviour which could be a violation of the Code – if they have, they should be named as respondents. The inappropriate naming of chief executive officers, mayors, chiefs of police, etc, who do not have personal involvement in the facts giving rise to the application, should be avoided. It is time to bring a principled approach back to who will be held to account for discrimination.

[i] Delargie v. St. Joseph’s Healthcare Hamilton, 2015 HRTO 1329

[ii] Breau v. Halton (Regional Municipality), 2016 HRTO 1055

[iii] Nakazi v. Bowland Dental Laboratories, 2017 HRTO 1204

[iv] It should be noted that there were also concerns about the ability of one of the organizational respondents to satisfy a remedy that may be ordered.

[v] Human Rights Commission v. Farris, 2012 ONSC 3876 (Div. Ct.)

Square Peg in a round hole


De Minimis Non Curat Lex Legal

The Latin phrase De Minimis Non Curat Lex Legal stands for the proposition that the law does not care for small or trifling matters. De Minimis was expressed in an 1818 English decision where the Court held that penalties should not be inflexibly severe where there are irregularities or very slight consequences or where the deviation was a “mere trifle” (i). De Minimis arose in the criminal context, but now is widely accepted as a common law defence available in both the criminal and civil context.

Application (or Misapplication) in the Human Rights Context

The Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario has applied this common law defence in a number of recent decisions. The problem is the Tribunal has yet to find an intelligible way to integrate this two hundred year old common law doctrine into the remedially-focused human rights world. Tribunal decisions applying this doctrine have largely arisen in contravention of settlement proceedings, where the parties resolve their dispute and one party subsequently breaches a term of settlement.

In Adorgloh v. Sentrex Communications, (ii)  a 2010 decision of the Tribunal, the Vice-Chair, before hearing any evidence or scheduling the hearing, stated by way of Case Assessment Direction that “it appears to me, without deciding the issue, that any damages for any delay of less than two months, given the amount in question…, would be minimal, assuming there is justification for awarding them.” Prior to hearing the evidence, the Tribunal made clear that it assumed the breach was minimal and did not mention the possible impact the breach may have had on Mr. Adorgloh. Following the teleconference, Tribunal found that the employer contravened a term of settlement and noted there was evidence presented that Mr. Adorgloh suffered mental health issues as a result. Despite this, the Tribunal focused solely on the technical nature of the breach itself and declined to award any remedy. In focusing on the seemingly trivial delay in payment the Tribunal failed to meaningfully consider the impact of the breach on Mr. Adorgloh. In fact, beyond noting that there was some evidence in this respect, the Tribunal did not even mention it in the analysis section of the Decision.

In Pereira v. Designer Furniture and Art, (iii) a decision released in October 2014, the Tribunal heard another contravention of settlement application where extensive evidence was proffered on the impact the contravention had on the Applicant in terms of her mental health. I was Counsel for the Applicant (no, this is not sour grapes – a much more important issue is at play) and made submissions on the application of the de minimis doctrine. I asked the Tribunal to consider the impact on the Ms. Pereira, instead of or alongside the technical nature of the breach. The Tribunal however neither mentioned the Applicant’s submissions on the application of the de minimis doctrine, nor was the impact on the Applicant mentioned at all. The Tribunal found there was a contravention but refused to order a remedy, again focusing solely on the technical nature of the breach. We asked the Tribunal to reconsider and received a boilerplate decision, again not addressing any of the Applicant’s arguments on de minimis. (iv)

It is firmly established that the Ontario Human Rights Code is remedial and not punitive. The objective is to make the Applicant whole, not punish the Respondent. So why is it that the Tribunal does not focus at all on the actual impact of the contravention on an Applicant, beyond just the technical appearance of the breach itself? Looking at the technical breach in isolation – for instance payment sent one month after it was due – may appear “trifling” or de minimis. But what if that one month delay caused an Applicant to lose his or her home or caused an Applicant dealing with serious mental health issues to fall into a depression and become unable to work for a significant period time. What if the Applicant contemplates suicide? I have represented parties in several matters where settlement has been contravened, and while not always the case, this is often the reality (particularly for applicants with serious mental health issues).

In assessing de minimis, the Tribunal must look at the impact of the contravention on the Applicant. If the technical nature of the breach is relevant at all, it should only be one factor, considered alongside the impact of the breach on the Applicant. The Respondent’s intention is irrelevant and the remedy is not to “punish” the Respondent. Remedial legislation focuses on fixing the harm caused. From my perspective, that is difficult and impossible to do when the Tribunal does not consider what that harm may be.

This highlights a bigger issue, perhaps for another article, on the dangers of parachuting common law principles into the human rights context without full appreciation as to how those principles fit with the remedial nature of the Code and established human rights principles.

End Notes


(i) See Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law v. Canada (Attorney General), [2004] 1 SCR 76 at paras at 200-207.

(ii) Adorgloh v. Sentrex Communications Inc., 2010 HRTO 2524

(iii) Pereira v. Designer Furniture and Art, 2014 HRTO 1599

(iv) Pereira v. Designer Furniture and Art, 2014 HRTO 1731