Posts Tagged ‘Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario’

Business secret

Discrimination is rarely overt. If an employer decides to fire an employee for discriminatory reasons, it typically does not say so in termination letters or exit interviews. In fact, on the advice of legal counsel, employers typically do not provide any reason for termination at all. Increasingly however, employers are relying upon language left open to speculation. Generic statements such as “not the best fit”, “not working out”, and “under performing”, leave employees questioning the real reason for termination. Where a Code-protected ground is in play, employees who are terminated for generic reasons are often left questioning whether they have experienced discrimination. The Tribunal has cautioned employers against the use of speculative language when a Code-protected ground is in play.[i]

Sometimes employers allege “other” reasons that appear legitimate, yet the employee still believes the Code-protected ground was the real reason for termination. Because most employers do not overtly discriminate, employees often lack direct evidence to prove that they have been fired, at least in part, because of a Code-protected ground. These Employees must make their case relying upon what is called circumstantial evidence. The employee must establish, on a balance of probabilities, that a Code-protected ground was a factor in the decision to terminate employment. The Code-protected ground does not have to be the primary factor or even a significant factor, it just has to be a factor – it can be one of ten reasons for example, even where the other nine reasons are non-discriminatory.

Circumstantial Evidence: The Three-Part Test

The Tribunal has adopted a three-part test to be used in cases where Applicants try to prove discrimination on the basis of circumstantial evidence:

  1. The initial evidentiary burden rests with the applicant to establish, on a balance of probabilities, a prima facie case that she was discriminated against with respect to her employment on the basis of [a prohibited ground];
  2. Upon presentation of a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the respondent to provide a credible and rational explanation demonstrating, on a balance of probabilities, that the impugned conduct or decision did not involve a discriminatory consideration, and
  3. If the Respondent is able to rebut the prima facie case, the burden returns to the applicant to establish, again on a balance of probabilities, that the respondent’s explanation is erroneous or a pretext masking the discriminatory ground.[ii]

The three steps are analyzed to determine the key question: whether the inference of discrimination is more probable from the evidence than the actual explanations offered by the Respondent? [iii]

Step # 1: Prima Facie Case

In cases of termination, a prima facie case is established by proving the following:

  1. The Applicant was qualified for the position;
  2. The Applicant’s employment was terminated, and
  3. That an employee, no better qualified for the position, subsequently obtained the position.[iv]

In cases of hiring or promoting, a prima facie case is established by proving the following:

  1. The Applicant was qualified for the particular employment;
  2. The Applicant was not hired, and
  3. That someone no better qualified but lacking the distinguishing feature which is the gravamen of the human rights complaint subsequently obtained the position.[v]
Step # 2: Employer’s Alternative Explanation

Explanations put forth by the employer will be scrutinized. The Tribunal has refused to accept lack of performance where the employer failed to take steps to address the employee’s performance and could not provide reasonable explanation for the failure to take steps.[vi] It is reasonable to expect employers, who typically keep records and document occurrences within the workplace, to have corroborative evidence where corroborative evidence can reasonably be expected. The lack of reasonably expected corroborative evidence will likely be relied upon by the Tribunal to reject the employer’s explanation.

Step # 3: Discriminatory Reason More Probable Than Not?

Here the Tribunal assesses whether the Applicant is able to rebut the alternative explanation alleged by the Respondent. Credibility is often in issue in step three. In terms of assessing credibility, the Tribunal has stated:

…an assessment of credibility requires more than listening to the witnesses and deciding who appears to be telling the truth. The Tribunal has adopted an analysis of credibility…which required that the decision maker determine whether the evidence is in harmony with the preponderance of probabilities which a practical and informed person would readily recognize as reasonable in that place and in those conditions…[F]actors that assist in making that determination include corroborative evidence from other witnesses, the extent to which witnesses may have an interest in the outcome of the case, or have a self-interest in testifying for one of the parties.[vii]

Conclusion

Employees who have a “feeling” that they have been discriminated against are sometimes correct. Employers who discriminate  cover their tracks and divert attention away from the discriminatory rationale behind their decision. The lack of direct evidence to prove discrimination should not deter an employee from proceeding with an Application before the Tribunal. A significant number of decisions from the Tribunal demonstrate that circumstantial evidence is often enough to establish discrimination.

ENDNOTES


[i] Dwivedi v. Brampton Public Library, 2010 HRTO 2471
[ii] Clennon v. Toronto East General Hospital, 2009 HRTO 1242 at para 69.
[iii] Wedley v. Northview Co-operative Homes Inc., 2008 HRTO 13
[iv] Clennon at para 78.
[v] Shakes v. Rex Pak Ltd. (1981), 3 C.H.R.R> D/1001 at para 8919.
[vi] Clennon at para 87.
[vii] Dwivedi at para 53.

3d man with dollar symbol.George Berger, an executive assistant to a Toronto City Councillor, brought an application to the Tribunal against the City of Toronto alleging that Councillor Frances Nunziata discriminated against him on the basis of his disability.[i] Berger suffered from adjustment mood disorder and multiple osteochondromatosis (a condition that involves arthritis in the fingers).

Berger commenced a leave of absence for medical reasons relating to his mental disability, which he claimed was related to a poisonous work environment caused by the alleged harassment. Berger requested the opportunity to work for another City Councillor when he returned to work. The City of Toronto argued that it was difficult to transfer executive assistants because City Councillors typically choose their own assistant. The City decided to pay Berger the remainder of his two year contract – approximately 6 months wages.

The Tribunal found that the allegations against Nunziata were not connected to a Code ground and therefore not within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction, however the City failed in its duty to accommodate Berger when presented with a request to be moved to a different City Councillor. The City decided not to explore whether it could accommodate the Applicant’s request, but rather decided to ‘buy out’ his employment. Vice-Chair Kaye Joachim stated:

[The City] failed to take adequate steps to canvass its organization for alternative comparable vacant positions in which to accommodate the applicant. Rather, it chose to resolve the situation by paying out the applicant’s contract.

The corporate respondent argued that the payment of wages on the remaining contract was a form of accommodation. I disagree. The applicant was denied the right to engage in meaningful work for the remainder of his contract. He was also denied the opportunity to seek renewal of the contract in whatever position he was in in November 2006.

In these circumstances, the applicant was essentially “forced” to seek a settlement.

Some will see six months’ pay for a one and a half year employee as reasonable – even generous. The duty to accommodate however required that the City explore accommodating Berger in an alternative position. The procedural component of the duty to accommodate requires employers to undergo a process – the City of Toronto failed to do so in this case. Forced settlements, even with generous sums of money, are not a substitute to the duty to accommodate.

Does this mean that the City of Toronto automatically had to explore placing Berger in an alternative position simply because he provided a medical note?

Not necessarily. The City could have questioned the medical evidence and insisted upon clarification. Medical doctors are not able to dictate accommodation, but rather their role is to provide evidence concerning their patient’s functional abilities and limitations. The City could have challenged the doctor’s conclusions,  but as Vice-Chair Joachim stated – “it was not open to it to do nothing”.


[i] Berger v. Toronto (City), 2011 HRTO 625

Beautiful Ageing face eyes

In 2011, Lina Rocha responded to a job advertisement for a personal assistant/receptionist position at Pardons and Waivers of Canada, paying $11.00 per hour for 30 hours per week. Lina was graduating from Microskills and seeking a placement for six weeks. In her email to Pardons and Waivers, Lina mentioned that she would be willing to “for 6 weeks free”. After an exchange of information, Lina was invited to an interview. Prior to the interview however Pardons and Waivers called Lina and asked her how old she was. Lina was turning 45. Lina than received an email saying that the “placement is not suitable for this position”

The Tribunal found that Pardons and Waivers had breached the Code in withdrawing the offer to attend an interview after Lina gave information about her age. During the hearing, Lina stated that she was stressed and depressed following the incident, believing that “it would be hard to find a job with my age…no one would want to hire me”.

In determining remedy, Vice-Chair Judith Keene cited a recent decision of the Tribunal[i] wherein the Tribunal considered two approaches that have been used in the past in assessing the damages for lost opportunity for individuals who did not successfully obtain job postings for discriminatory reasons:

  1. In the first approach the Tribunal would take into account the fact that the Applicant might not have obtained the position in any event, even in the absence of discrimination. If there is a serious possibility that the individual would have obtained the position, then there is loss that is capable of giving rise to an award of damages. The assessment of the amount of damages requires an assessment of the likelihood that the person would have obtained the position in any event.
  2. The second approach would require the Tribunal to assess, on a balance of probabilities, whether or not the Applicant would have obtained the position. If the Tribunal determined he or she would have, damages for lost wages should be awarded. If the Tribunal decided that he or she would not have obtained the position in any event, the Applicant would not be awarded any damages for lost wages.

Vice-Chair Keene adopted the first approach and found that “there is at least a 50% likelihood that the applicant would have continued in employment with the respondent beyond the six weeks of her initial unpaid placement”. What is troubling about this decision is that Vice-Chair Keene did not award lost wages for the six week period that Lina offered to work for free. Lina was in a particularly vulnerable position – she was 45 years old, recently divorced and trying to enter the labour market after a lengthy absence. Vice-Chair Keene acknowledged this, stating at paragraph 6:

The applicant indicated that she had undertaken a job skills upgrading course in computer and customer service skills, after a period of difficult personal circumstances that included the end of her marriage. She had wanted to get into the workforce and do something on her own…

Vice-Chair Keene, a respected members of the Tribunal with extensive experience in human rights, made a critical error in this decision. Lina’s “internship” or offer of free work would not have met the criteria set out in the Ontario Employment Standards Act. The Act sets out the minimum employment entitlements for all workers in Ontario.

Unpaid Internships and the Employment Standards Act

There are two exceptions within the ESA. The first exception applies where the intern is performing their internship under a defined school, college or university program and is not doing the work of an employee.

The second exception applies where the employer is providing training. Within this exception are six criteria must be met before a company can offer an unpaid internship to an employee:

  1. The internship must have an educational purpose for the Intern;
  2. The training must benefit the Intern;
  3. The training cannot benefit the employer in any real way;
  4. The Intern does not displace employees of the person providing the training;
  5. The Intern should not expect compensation for his or her work and must explicitly be told they will not receive compensation, and
  6. The Intern should not be promised a position in the future as incentive to work for free.[ii]

Lina did not have the ability to contract out of the minimum entitlements, and given that the advertisement was for an employee, it certainly could not be suggested that Lina’s situation would fall under criteria 3, 4, and 6 above. The Tribunal did not provide an explanation to explain why an employer would be permitted to reap the benefit of a clear violation of the Employment Standards Act.
Perhaps this is an example of the Tribunal failing to adequately grasp the law separate and apart from the Human Rights Code. Perhaps it was just an oversight.

Case Citation (Liability Decision):   Lina Roche v. Pardons and Waivers of Canada, a division of 1339835 Ontario Limited, 2012 HRTO 2234

Case Citation (Remedy Decision):   Lina Roche v. Pardons and Waivers of Canada, a division of 1339835 Ontario Limited, 2013 HRTO 537


[i] Ravi De Souza v. 1469328 Ontario Inc., 2008 HRTO 23

[ii] See section 3(5) of the Act which excludes individuals “who perform work under a program approved by a college of applied arts and technology or a university.” Then see section 1(2) of the Act which sets out the criteria which makes a person receiving training from an employee, an employee and subject to the minimum standards in the Act.