It has been argued in the past that a reprisal application cannot be commenced outside of one of the five social areas listed in the Code (employment, housing, services, contract or membership). This situation may arise when a relative of a respondent approaches an applicant in a crowded mall for example, and berates the applicant for filing an application against the respondent.

It has also been argued that a reprisal application cannot be brought against an individual who is not a Respondent in the initial Application. This would arise where the Applicant in the aforementioned scenario then commence an application against the relative, who is not a party to the initial application.

While the Tribunal has not conclusively dealt with these issues specifically, it seems apparent that the a reprisal application can be commenced against a party who is not an existing respondent, and does not require a social area.

If the Tribunal were to find that a social area is required for a reprisal application, the Tribunal would be reading a restrictive element into the Code that would expose applicants to intimidation and threats without recourse. I will illustrate this by example:

Assume that Joe and Bob work together. Bob is African American. Joe makes several clear and damaging racist remarks to Bob in the workplace. Bob files an Application with the Tribunal in the social area of employment on the enumerated ground of race. The employer investigates and discharges Joe from his employment because of the severity of the discrimination. Joe’s wife repeatedly calls Bob and Bob’s family, swearing at him for bringing the Application that resulted in her husband’s termination.

To allow intimidation and threats for claiming human rights, even if outside of a social area, would defeat the purpose of section 8, which as the Tribunal has stated in Noble is to “ensure that individuals may claim and enforce the fundamental rights embodied in the Code without fear or intimidation”.

The necessity of an existing Respondent or social area is also not provided for statutorily. Section 8 does not refer to social area. It simply states that the Applicant has a right to claim his or her rights, free from reprisal. It does not say free from reprisal in a social area and it does not say free from reprisal from a Respondent. Moreover, the restrictive elements are not found anywhere within the three-part test of the Tribunal.

Conclusion

It is unlikely that the Tribunal would accept either argument:

  1. That a reprisal application must be commenced in one of the five social areas, or
  2. That a reprisal application cannot be commenced against an individual who is not a respondent in an initial human rights application.

The Supreme Court of Canada has stated on a number of occasions that the Code ought to be interpreted in a broad and expansive manner to provide meaning to human rights in Canada. It is highly unlikely that the Tribunal would restrict reprisal applications without guidance from the Legislature.

Family and house icon logo

The Ontario Human Rights Code protects employees on the ground of family status – that is, being in a parent-child relationship.

McDonald v. Mid-Huron Roofing

In McDonald v. Mid-Huron Roofing[i], a 2009 decision of the Tribunal, the Applicant worked for a small company with a handful of employees. The Applicant’s wife was pregnant and the applicant ended up taking several days off of work to attend his wife’s medical appointments relating to her pregnancy.

The Applicant’s wife suffered from complications from her pregnancy and was admitted to the hospital. The Applicant informed his supervisor that he needed to take some time off work to be with his wife. The birth was premature and shortly thereafter the Applicant’s wife again suffered complications, losing consciousness and being transported to the emergency by ambulance. The discovered his wife was taken to the hospital while at work and he informed his employer he would return in twenty minutes and left.

The Applicant attempted to find a babysitter to attend to his new baby so that he could return to work, but ultimately was unable to. When he did not return to work after the promised twenty minutes, his employment was terminated.

Even though the employer did not disapprove of employees with families, the Tribunal held that discrimination occurs even in situations where all employees are treated the same; however that treatment impacts one employee differently because he or she has special circumstances. The Applicant had provided his employer with the necessary information, that he had to care for his newborn son (family status), and from that point forward the employer had a duty to accommodate the Applicant short of undue hardship.

The employer argued that it would have suffered undue hardship, suggesting that the Applicant’s absences were impacting other employees’ morale and efficiency declined as the employer was already short-staffed. The Tribunal noted that the absences were inconvenient to the employer but were not sufficient to prove undue hardship. The Tribunal made it clear that morale is not an appropriate consideration in assessing undue hardship. The Tribunal awarded lost wages to the Applicant and $20,000.00 in general damages for pain, suffering and harm to the Applicant’s dignity.

CONCLUSION

Employees are entitled to accommodation when emergency situations arise in relation to their children. The parent-child relationship is also triggered when an employee cares for an elderly parent. Employees are not entitled to claim family status every time a family situation arises however. Tribunal jurisprudence makes it clear that employees must try to deal with family issues in a manner that does not impact their workplace obligations prior to requesting accommodation. Not every family issue will fall under the ground of family status.

END NOTES


[i] 2009 HRTO 1306